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Abstract—With the rapid growth in multimedia services and
the enormous offers of video contents in online social networks,
users have difficulty in obtaining their interests. Therefore, var-
ious personalized recommendation systems have been proposed.
However, they ignore that the accelerated proliferation of social
media data has led to the big data era, which has greatly impeded
the process of video recommendation. In addition, none of them
has considered both the privacy of users’ contexts (e,g., social
status, ages and hobbies) and video service vendors’ repositories,
which are extremely sensitive and of significant commercial
value. To handle the problems, we propose a cloud-assisted
differentially private video recommendation system based on
distributed online learning. In our framework, service vendors
are modeled as distributed cooperative learners, recommending
videos according to user’s context, while simultaneously adapting
the video-selection strategy based on user-click feedback to
maximize total user clicks (reward). Considering the sparsity
and heterogeneity of big social media data, we also propose a
novel geometric differentially private model, which can greatly
reduce the performance (recommendation accuracy) loss. Our
simulation shows the proposed algorithms outperform other
existing methods and keep a delicate balance between computing
accuracy and privacy preserving level.
Index Terms—Online social networks, multimedia big data,
video recommendation, distributed online learning, differential
privacy, media cloud.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, online social networks (OSNs) have beenmassively growing, where users can share and consume all
kinds of multimedia contents. As a result, given the numerous
different genres of videos in social media, how to discover the
videos of personal interest and recommend them to individual
users are of great significance. Recommendation is foreseen
to be one of the most important services that can provide
such personalized multimedia contents to users [1]. Several
companies have demonstrated initial successes in multimedia
recommendation system design. [3] reported that YouTube
won its first Emmy for video recommendations. Actually,
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most OSNs recommend video content to their users based
on the user’s rich context information (e.g., social status,
ages, professions, health conditions and hobbies) contained
in their released multimedia data. Regarding this way, several
recommendation systems have been proposed [32], [24].
However, there exist two major challenges in this scenario.
The first challenge comes from the big data’s role in the
personalized recommendation. In detail, OSNs have accel-
erated the popularity of applications and services, resulting
in the explosive increase of social multimedia data. In this
case, multimedia big data puts companies in a favorite po-
sition to have access to much more contextual information
[2]. However, how to harness and actually use big data to
effectively personalize recommendation is a monumental task.
Traditional stand-alone multimedia systems cannot handle the
storage and processing of this large-scale datasets [7]. Besides
that, complex and various user-generated multimedia big data
in the OSNs results in the sparsity and heterogeneity of users’
context data. Hence, it is extremely challenging to implement
recommendation with the multimedia big data.
Furthermore, the privacy in recommendation has raised
widely concern. On the one hand, as declared in [5], user’s sen-
sitive context information may be exposed by the recommen-
dation results. Intuitively, the more detailed the information
related to the user is, the more accurate the recommendations
for the user are. But once the recommendation records are
accessed by a malicious third party, individual features can
be inferred by them merely based on the outcome of the
recommendation. For example, advertising video of luxury
goods recommended to a particular person indicate the income
level of this user. Also basketball video recommendation for
the same user exposed it’s hobby. Then with additional side
information, the malicious party may identify the person in
real life. On the other hand, the inventory of videos is an
important commercial secret for the service vendor. As for the
service vendors’ incentives, they rely on stored video source
files to gain popularity among users. Intuitively, video service
vendors are selfish and they refuse the inference of what they
have in the inventories by the revenue gain of each video.
Consequently, avoiding the divulge of video contents of each
service vendor is desirable.
Taking the above two difficulties into consideration, es-
tablishing a privacy-preserving video recommendation sys-
tem with multimedia bid data can be extremely challenging.
Traditional recommender systems for multimedia, including
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collaborative filtering (CF) [10] and content-based (CB) rec-
ommendation [9] can provide meaningful multimedia recom-
mendations at an individual level. However, their stand-alone
systems have difficulties in dealing with tremendous high-
dimensional multimedia big data. As for the privacy concern
in recommendation, previously, anonymity was the main tool
in recommendation [11]. But the fact that the information can
only be partially removed will allow for re-identification.
Differential privacy [12] proposed recently is a heuristic
method to solve this problem. Informally, differential privacy
means that the output is going to be almost exactly the
same whether it includes a single user’s data in the input
datasets. Therefore, hardly can one make an accurate infer-
ence on signal user’s feature based on the recommendation
results. Besides, adding laplace noise into the recommendation
rewards can hide small changes that arise from a single
video’s contribution. Thus, the revenue gain of one signal
video cannot be deduced. Several studies have incorporated it
into recommendation systems [13], [14], but their works only
focus on small-scale media datasets, yet executing differential
privacy in a large datasets often impacts little on accuracy,
which works extremely efficiently under the big data context
In conclusion, it is necessary to design a privacy-preserving
video recommendation that can handle the multimedia big data
and achieve high-accurate recommendations.
In this paper, we introduce differential privacy into dis-
tributed online learning to design an efficient and high-accurate
timely recommendation system based on multimedia cloud
computing [15]. As illustrated in Fig. 1, user-generated mul-
timedia big data (e.g, images, audio clips and videos) is first
translated to remote media cloud and stored in decentralized
data centers (DCs). Then use technologies such like Bag-of-
Features Tagging (BoFT) [6] to extract user’s context vectors
and convert the results to distributed video service vendors
(servers). Finally recommended video contents are pushed to
multimedia applications in OSNs.
Our main theme in this media cloud based scenario is that
video service vendors are modeled as decentralized online
learners, who try to learn from user’s high-dimensional context
data and match it to the optimal video. The service vendors
are connected together via a fixed network over the media
cloud, each of whom experience inflows of users’ context
vectors to them. If service vendors cannot find suitable videos
in their repositories for the coming user, they can forward
the use’s context data to neighbor service vendors, who will
find out the suitable video in his repository to recommend
to this user. At the end of each time slot, the reward of
the recommended video is observed. Service vendors can
learn from the result and adjust their selection strategy next
time. Since the extracted context vectors from multimedia big
data are high-dimensional and omnifarious, the context space
with d dimensions (d is the number of user features) can be
extremely huge and heterogeneous. Then, learning the most
matchable video for each individual can be extremely slow.
Therefore, each service vendor initially groups users (partition
the context space) with similar context into rough crowds, and
then they dynamically refine the partition strategies over time.
To goal of each service vendor is to maximize its long term
Media Cloud
Context 
extractors
Video service vendors
User interface
Recommended 
videos
users
Fig. 1: A general illustration of multimedia cloud based video
recommendation system.
expected total recommendation reward and do not want to
reveal their repositories to other service vendors. However, in
the cooperation, each service vendor will share some informa-
tion such as the user’s context vectors and the videos’ revenue
gains with neighbor service vendors. Then, service vendors can
infer the repositories of other service vendors from the shared
information. To solve this privacy leakage, we adopt Laplace
mechanism [12], adding noise to shared revenue gains. As for
the users’ privacy, to prevent the exposure of their feature by
the recommendation videos, adding noise to the revenue gains
is not noneffective. Because the gain is produced after the
recommended video is revealed and disturbing the accurate
estimation of gains of their own videos with this noise is not
necessary. Thus, we employ exponential mechanism [16] to
protect the users’ privacy, where the service vendors randomly
select the video according a computed exponential probabili-
ties. Faced with the fact that user’s contexts (d-dimensional
point in the context space) are sparse distributed over the
context space, we propose a novel geometric differentially
private method to promote the total reward. This paper makes
the following contributions:
• We propose a media cloud based video recommendation
system and rigorously formulate it as a distributed online
learning problem. In our model, decentralized service
vendors work cooperatively to deal with large-scale con-
textual data.
• To handle the dimensionality and sparsity of the mul-
timedia big data, our method adaptively partitions the
context space for each service vendor. Our evaluation
results show this method has lower performance loss and
converges fast to optimal strategy.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to deal
with the privacy issue of both the social media users and
video service vendors in recommendation. We integrate
exponential mechanism and Laplace mechanism simulta-
neously into distributed learning systems. We guarantee
ε-differential privacy while not coming at substantial
expense in total reward.
• We propose a “geometric differentially private model” to
deal with the sparse contextual data, which can reduce
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the performance loss extensively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we briefly review the related work. Section III
presents the necessary background concepts of this work. In
Section IV, we detail the system model, define our perfor-
mance metric, the adversary model and design goals. Section
V describes the design of algorithms and provides theoretical
analysis of the performances. In section VI, we present our
geometric differentially private model. Section VII discusses
our experimental results and analysis. Section VIII concludes
this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Several recommendation algorithms have been exploited
in the past. Content-based filtering (CB) recommendation
systems [17]–[19] focus on the similarities of content titles,
tags and descriptions and they find user-interested items based
on user’s individual reading history. CB recommender systems
are easy to deploy. Nonetheless, simply representing the users
profile information by a bag of words is not sufficient to
capture the exact interests of the user. Collaborative filtering
(CF) recommendation systems [20], [21] rely on abundant user
transaction histories and content popularity. CF systems re-
quire enough history consumption record and feedback, which
is not suitable to real-time recommendation. Graph-based (GB)
recommendation systems [22], [23] build a graph to calculate
the correlation between recommendation objects. Then, rec-
ommendation problem turns into a node selection problem on a
graph. Besides that, users cotagging behaviors and friendships
in social network are described by a graph. Combining graph
theory with recommendation is a marvellous idea. However, in
OSNs, this graph can be continuously changeable. Construct-
ing and storing such graph are impractical. Context-aware
recommendation systems make recommendation based on the
contextual information both of items and users. [24] has done
a pioneering in this area, but its centralized framework fails
to satisfy the need of big data environment. Our distributed
cooperative recommendation framework can arrange recom-
mendation timely under big data environment and provides
rigorous performance guarantees.
As for the privacy in recommendation systems, anonymity
was the main tool [11]. However, especially for rich, high-
dimensional big data, most anonymization techniques appear
to cripple the utility of the data [25], [26]. In addition, though
anonymized, users may be re-identification in the presence of
colluding adversaries or those with auxiliary information [28].
On the other hand, prior works lay emphasis on cryptography
[27] to make the privacy-sensitive data inaccessible to any
outsiders and the server by means of encryption. But it usually
incurs high computation and communication overheads. Dif-
ferential privacy [12] proposed in recent years has been incor-
porated into recommendation by several studies. McSherry and
Mironov [14] show how to adapt the leading algorithms used
in the Netflix Prize competition to make privacy-preserving
recommendations. This is typically accomplished by adding
noise to the item covariance matrix, to hide small changes that
arise from a single users contribution. Ashwin et al. [8] and
TABLE I: Comparison with prior work in recommender sys-
tems.
Content-based
(CB),Collaborative
filtering(CF),graph-
based(GB),context-
aware(CA)
Anonymity(A),
cryptography
(Cr),differential
privacy(DP)
Private
target
Centralized
(C),
decen-
tralized
(D)
[17]–[19] CB \ None C
[20], [21] CF \ None C
[22], [23] GB \ None C
[25] CA \ None C
[32] CA \ None D
[11] Hybrid CF A User C
[27] CF Cr User C
[13] GB DP User D
[14] CF DP User C
[8] GB DP User C
Our
work CA DP
User,
service
provider
D
Jorgensen [13] combine differential privacy with social graph
for recommendation. But their work only study the privacy
of sensitive user-item preferences and connections between
people, rather than individual features. Our work aims at the
privacy of individual features contained in their context data
and the secrecy of service vendors’ data.
III. BACKGROUNDS
A. Differential Privacy
The concept of differential privacy is originally introduced
by Dwork [12], which gives us a riorous definition of privacy.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [12]). A randomized
algorithm M has ε differential privacy if for any two input
sets A and B with a single input difference, and for any set
of outcomes R ∈ Range(M),
P[M(A) ∈ R] ≤ exp(ε)× P[M(B) ∈ R].
Informally, differential privacy means that the outcome of
two nearly identical input datasets (different for a single
component) should also be nearly identical. Thus, attacker is
not able to get the information of the individual’s information
by comparing the query result of A and B. In our model, the
input datasets are users’ context vectors. The privacy ε is the
parameter to measure the privacy level of the algorithm. The
choice of ε is a trade-off between the privacy and the accuracy
of the output.
One effective tool is the Laplace Mechanism [12], i.e.,
M(x) = f(x)+Lap(∆f
ε
). In this way, f() is a counting query
on the data set X , and Lap() is the Laplace distribution with
standard deviation
√
2∆f
ε
to scale the counting query result.
Definition 2 (Sensitivity of Laplace mechanism [34]). The
sensitivity of a function f is:
∆f = max
x,y
‖f(x)− f(y)‖1, (1)
where x and y are input datasets differ on at most one compo-
nent. The sensitivity of a function f captures the magnitude,
by which a single component can change the function f in the
worst case. Indeed, the sensitivity of a function gives an upper
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bound on how much we must perturb its output to preserve
privacy.
Corollary 1 (Composability [16]). The sequential applica-
tion of randomized computation Mi, each giving εi differential
privacy, yields
∑
i εi differential privacy.
Referring to differential privacy, another powerful tool is
the exponential mechanism [16]. The exponential mechanism
ME(x,u,R) selects and outputs an element r ∈ R with
probability proportional to exp( εu(x,r)2∆u ). Here, x is the input
data set we want to protect, r is the output of the mechanism
and u(x, k) is the unity function. There is also a definition of
the sensitivity:
Definition 3 (Sensitivity of Exponential Mechanism [34]).
The sensitivity of exponential mechanism is defined as follows:
∆u = max
r∈R
max
x1,x2:‖x1−x2‖1≤1
|u(x1, r)− u(x2, r)| . (2)
The sensitivity measures the change of utility function
u(x, r), when one item in targeted data set changes. An
important theorem can also be derived as [34] :
Theorem 1. Fixing a database x, let ROPT =
{r ∈ R : u(x, r) = OPTu(x)} denote the set of elements in
R which attain utility score OPTu(x). Then, When used to
select an output r ∈ R, the exponential mechanism εεq(x)
ensures that:
P[u(x, εεq(x)) < max
r
u(x, r) − 2∆u
ε
(ln( |R||ROPT |) + t)]
≤ exp(−t).
(3)
B. Online Learning
Our proposed distributed learning method derives from
contextual bandits [29]. This algorithm learns form the context
information available at each time, which, in this case, is
the users’ context vectors. Then, it keeps an index that
weights the estimated performance and uncertainty of each
action (recommended video or neighbor service vendor in
this case) and choose the action with highest index at each
time. Furthermore, the indices for the next time slot for all
actions are updated based on the feedback received from
the chosen action (users click feedback). There exist some
works studying the contextual bandit [29], [30], where the best
action given the context is learned online. C. Tekin et al. first
proposed a distributed contextual bandit framework for big
data classification [31] and social recommendations [32]. But
the uniform partition method proposed in their work does not
fit into the sparse big data. A context-aware partition method
for big data proposed in [33] is a heuristic work. Nonetheless,
the single-learner framework can not satisfy the need of the
massive big social data. We combine adaptive context space
partition with distributed learning, which can efficiently handle
above difficulties.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the system model and
assumptions. Then we give our performance metric. Finally,
we outline the adversary model and design goals.
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Fig. 2: A general explanation of our video recommendation
system. Each service vendor keeps a context space partition
of arriving contexts. This partition process is dynamic by time.
A. System Model
The system model is shown in Fig. 2. There are M dis-
tributed service vendors distributed in media cloud, which are
indexed by set M = {1, 2, 3...,M}. They work independently
and cooperatively in discrete time setting t = 1, 2, ..., T . Each
vendor owns a set of videos. We denote the set of videos
Mi = {k1,k2,··· ,kK} for service vendor i. At each time slot,
the following events happen sequentially for service vendor
i: 1) a user’s extracted context vector xi(t) comes to service
vendor i; 2) The service vendor i chooses one video from his
repository Mi or sends the context vector to neighbor service
vendor j, who will select one video from Mj for the user with
this context; 3) At the end of each time slot, the user’s click
feedback fk,xi(t)(t) (If user clicks, it equals one, otherwise
zero, where k is the recommended video.) is observed; 4) The
service vendor i learns from the feedback, then promotes the
selection strategy for next user.
We describe the details and some reasonable assumptions
here.
1) Each service vendor has access to only its own video
repository. Service vendors are selfish in the sense that, they
do not reveal their repositories to other service vendors. But
they know the number of videos of other service vendors.
In this article, we assume every service vendor possesses K
videos.
2) The context information xi(t) of the data is a high-
dimensional vector. Each coordinate of the vector represents
the feature of the user (e.g., gender, hobby, profession and
age). We use the hypercube X = [0, 1]d to denote its range,
where d is the dimension of the space. Given the setting of
big data, d is extremely large and those context vectors are
distributed non-uniformed in the hypercube space.
3) At the end of each time slot, we use a random variable
fk,x(t) to represent the reward (user click feedback) produced
by the recommended video k. If user clicks the recommended
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video k, it equals one, otherwise zero. Let uk,x be the expected
reward of a video conditional on the context x. Different
videos have different expected reward for the same context.
We aim to find the video with the highest expected reward for
that context. Naturally, similar contexts have similar expected
reward with the same video. We use the Lipschitz condition
to describe this similarity:
|uk,x1 − uk,x2 | ≤ L‖x1 − x2‖
α
. (4)
The goal of the service vendor is to try its best to rec-
ommend video with highest expected reward. Consequently,
if the service vendor does not have matchable video to its
coming user’s context, he will forward the context to neighbor
service vendor. Our algorithm chooses another service vendor
by comparing the average rewards of each service vendor with
those of its own videos. To be reasonable, in this distributed
contextual bandit framework, we call Ki =Mi∩M−i the set
of arms (videos and other service vendors) of service vendor
i, where M−i =M−{i}.
B. Performance Metric
Definition 4 (Optimal Arm). Our benchmark when evaluat-
ing the performance of the learning algorithm is the optimal
solution, which selects the arm k with the highest expected
reward from the set Ki =Mi∩M−i given context xt at time
t. Specifically, the optimal arm we compare against is given
by:
k∗ (xt) = argmax
k∈Ki
uk,xt , ∀xt ∈ X . (5)
Knowing the optimal solution means that learner i (service
vendor i in this case) knows the arm in Ki that yields the
highest expected accuracy for each xt ∈ X .
Definition 5 (The Regret of Learning). We define the regret
as a performance measure of the learning algorithm used by
the learners. Simply, the regret of a learning algorithm for
learner i is the reward gap between optimal arms and selected
arms:
R(T ) =
∑T
t=1
uk∗(xt),xt − E
[∑T
t=1
fk(t),xt(t)
]
, (6)
where k(t) denotes the video or neighbor service vendor
chosen at time t, k∗(xt) denotes the best choise for context xt.
Regret gives the convergence rate of the total expected reward
of the learning algorithm to the value of the optimal solution.
C. Adversary Model and Design Goals
As similar privacy concern for the users’ sensitive context
data in [5], we consider a adversary model as follows: (1) Ma-
licious third party who can gain access to the recommendation
outputs and own some side information such as location about
some users. The goal of this malicious third part is to deduce
a particular user’s features by observing the recommendation
outputs. Then, they can identify the media user in the real
world with deduced features and additional side information.
(2) Selfish and curious service vendors who want to infer
neighbors’ repositories from shared information. For example,
the curious service vendor forward a sports fan’s context to
a neighbor service vendor, who output a video and receive
high reward. Then, the curious service vendors know that this
neighbor service vendor owns a video about sport.
To address the adversary models above, we proposed a
differentially private learning algorithm. Our scheme achieves
privacy protection and performance guarantees as follows:
• Users’ Privacy Guarantee: Even if the malicious party
can gain access to the recommendation outputs, it is
less likely for he to infer the user’s feature from the
recommended result. And we prove that our proposed
algorithm can preserve ε-differential privacy for user’s
privacy.
• Service vendors’ Privacy Guarantee: The curious service
vendor can not distinguish the video of neighbor service
vendors by shared information. The proposed algorithm
can preserve ε-differential privacy for service vendors.
• Performance Guarantee: Our proposed algorithm can
guarantee the regret in equation (6) is sublinear con-
verged, i.e., R(T ) = O(T γ) such that γ < 1 . A smaller
γ will result in faster convergent rate. In the following
section we will propose a private distributed learning
algorithm with sublinear regret.
• Privacy-Reward Trad-off : Our analysis shows that the
higher level the privacy is preserved, the lower the
total reward is received. By varying the value of the
privacy parameter ε, we can keep a trad-off between the
total recommendation reward and the privacy preservation
level.
V. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVATE DISTRIBUTED ONLINE
LEARNING ALGORITHM FOR CLOUD BASED VIDEO
RECOMMENDAION
Since the reward of each recommended video for different
users have unknown stochastic distributions, the natural way
to learn a video’s performance is to record and update its
sample mean reward for the same context vector. Using such
an empirical value to evaluate the expected reward is the basic
approach to help the service vendors to learn. However, the
context space X can be very large, recording and updating the
sample mean reward for each context are scarcely possible.
The memory capacity of the sever can not meet the need of
keeping a sample mean reward for all contexts. To overcome
the difficulty, we dynamically partition the entire context space
into multiple smaller context subspaces (according to the
number of arriving users). Then, we maintain and update the
sample mean reward estimates for each subspace. This is due
to the fact that the expected rewards of a video are likely to
be similar for similar contexts.
In our distributed framework, each service vendor i ∈ M
dynamically partitions the context space X when context xi(t)
arrives to them. To better understand the proposed P-DAP
algorithm, we apart it into two algorithms, i.e., Algorithm
1 and Algorithm 2. Service vendor i runs Algorithm 1 to
select video or request neighbor service vendor’s help for
its own user. Because service vendor i does not outward
recommendation revenue gain to other service vendors, we
only need to protect user’s privacy and we adopt exponential
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mechanism in Algorithm 1 (named as ExP-DAP) to achieve
this protection. When service vendor i receives users’ extracted
context vectors forwarded from other service vendors, it runs
Algorithm 2 (named as LaP-DAP) to select videos and protect
the privacy of selected videos. Two algorithms are carried out
simultaneously, although we describe them separately.
Next we present our online learning algorithm. In section
VI, we will refine the proposed algorithm to geometric differ-
ential privacy to reduce the performance loss.
A. Algorithm Description
In this subsection, we describe our differentially Private
Distributed learning with Adaptive context space Partition al-
gorithm (P-DAP for short) for video recommendation. We first
introduce several useful concepts for describing the proposed
algorithm.
• Context subspace. A context subspace C is a subspace of
the entire context space X , i.e., C ⊆ X . In this paper, all
context subspaces are created by uniformly partitioning
the context space on each dimension. Thus, each context
subspace is a d-dimensional hypercube with side length
being m−l, where m is number of segmentations of each
dimension to be partitioned and l is the partition level.
To be specific, when we assign m = 2, d = 1 and entire
space is [0, 1], then the entire context space [0, 1] is a
level-0 subspace, [0, 1/2) and [1/2, 1] are two level-1
subspaces etc.
• Active context subspace. We define a set named P t
in which all existing subspaces is collected, and P t
is changing over time. For example, when d = 1,
{[0, 1]}, {[0, 1/2), (1/2, 1]} are two sets of active context
subspaces. A context subspace C is active if it is in the
current context subspace set P t, i.e. C ∈ P t.
• Notations. For service vendor i and each active context
subspace C ∈ P t, the algorithm maintains a counter
N ik,C(t) recording the number of times when k is se-
lected for contexts belong to subspace C. rik,C(t) es-
timates the sample mean reward of video k for the
context subspace C up to time t. We have r¯ik,C(t) =∑
x(t)∈C f
i
k,x(t)/N
i
k,C(t). The algorithm also maintains a
counter M iC(t) that records the number of context arrivals
to C up to time t.
To begin with, we present our Algorithm 1 in the following
3 phases: Phase 1: Exploration and Reward Estimation
?
????????????????
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Fig. 3: A process of dynamic partition of context space
Algorithm 1 ExP-DAP for service vendor i’s own user
1: Input: k ∈ Ki; m, p, A, K , ǫ, ∆u, G1(t), G2(t), G3(t).
2: Initialize: P t = {X}, r¯ik,C(0) = 0, ∀k ∈ Ki, M iC (0) = 0,
N ik,C(0) = 0, l = 0
3: for t = 1, ..., T , xi(t) ∈ C do
4: if ∃k ∈Mi, such that N ik,C(t) < G1(t) then
5: Select k and observe f ik,C(t).
6: else if ∃k ∈M−i, such that N i1,k,C(t) < KG3(t) then
7: Forward xi(t) to service vendor k.
8: else if ∃k ∈M−i, such that N ik,C(t) < G2(t) then
9: Forward xi(t) to service vendor k and receive
f ik,C(t).
10: else
11: for all k ∈Mi do
12: P[select k] = exp
(
ǫrik,C(t)
2∆u
)/ ∑
k∈Mi
exp
(
ǫrik,C (t)
2∆u
)
.
13: end for
14: Select ki ∈ Mi according to computed probability
distribution.
15: Select kj ∈ M−i such that kj = argmax
k∈M−i
rik,C(t).
16: Call k such that rik,C(t) = max
(
riki,C(t), r
i
kj ,C
(t)
)
.
17: end if
18: Update M iC (t), N ik,C(t), r¯ik,C(t).
19: if M tC ≥ Ampl then
20: Partition C.
21: end if
22: end for
Upon each context data arrival, service vendor i first checks
to which subspace C in the set P t the context belongs and
the level of C. To get accurate performance estimation of each
arm k ∈ Mi, service vendor i needs to judge whether k has
been fully explored (line 4, 5). Since service vendor i does
not know the performance service vendor k’s videos, it needs
to send neighbor service vendor k some context samples to
train it and make sure it will mostly select optimal video. The
N i1,k,C(t) denotes the times when k ∈ M−i is selected for
training. In the training process, service vendor i dose not need
to communicate with service vendor k to observe the reward
f ik,x(t)(t) (line 6, 7). If each service vendor k ∈M−i has been
fully trained, service vendor i start to explore the performance
of leaner k ∈ M−i and observe the reward of each k (line 8,
9). The control function G1(t), G2(t) and G3(t) ensure that
video is selected sufficiently many number of times so that the
sample mean estimates rik,C(t) are accurate enough. And we
set different control function for k ∈ M−i and k ∈ Mi, i.e.,
G2(t) is larger than G1(t). Because for k ∈M−i, the reward
rik,C(t) is added with noise, we need more times to evaluate
performance of k ∈ M−i.
Phase 2: Decision with Privacy Protection
For subspace C, when all arms have been fully explored,
there are accurate sample mean estimations for each arm. In
traditional bandit algorithms, the learners (service vendor in
this case) usually select the arm with the highest sample mean
reward. However, the optimal arm will expose the individual
feature. Thus, to protect the user’s privacy, service vendor i
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first randomly choose one arm ki ∈ Mi according to the
computed probability distribution, where ∆u is the sensitivity
of exponential mechanism (line 11-14). Then, it select another
arm kj ∈ M−i with the highest estimated reward. Finally
service vendor i compare the estimated reward of kj and ki,
then it select the one with higher estimated reward for context
xi(t) (line 15, 16). We will prove this randomly selection
scenario guarantee ε-differential privacy in next our analysis
section.
Phase 3: Update and Partition the Context Subspace
At the end of each time slot, the algorithm first up-
dates M iC (t), r¯ik,C(t) and N ik,C(t), where M iC (t) =
M iC (t) + 1, N
i
k,C(t) = N
i
k,C(t) + 1 and r¯ik,C(t) =∑
x(t)∈C f
i
k,x(t)/N
i
k,C(t). Then the algorithm decides whether
to further partition the current subspace C, depending on
whether we have sufficient context vectors arrivals in C.
Specifically, if M iC(t) ≥ Ampl at time t, C will be further
partitioned, where p and m are positive numbers. When
partitioning is needed, C is uniformly partitioned into md
smaller hypercubes. Each hypercube is a level-(l+1) subspace
with side-length 1/m of that of C. Then C is removed from
the current context set P t. New subspaces are added into P t.
Fig. 3 provides us an illustration of this partition process when
m = 2, d = 2.
Then, we describe Algorithm 2 as follows. In our problem
setting, in order to protect the privacy of neighbor service
vendors, we face a big challenge that traditional differential
privacy only apply to static database. By contrast, the datasets
we want to protect are dynamically releasing over time.
In detail, suppose at every time step t ∈ [T ], one entry
from dataset D, fk,x(t) ∈ {0, 1} arrives and the task is to
output vt =
∑t
τ=1 fk,x(τ) while ensuring the complete output
sequence 〈v1, ..., vT 〉 is ε-differential private. To overcome this
challenge, we use a tree based aggregation method initially
proposed by Dwork [36], Chan [35].
Tree based aggregation. Assume for simplicity that T =
2α for some positive integer α. We create a binary tree, i.e.,
Treek for each video k ∈ Mi with its leaf nodes being
f1, ..., fT . As illustrated in Fig. 4, at each time slot, when new
reward is produced, we insert the value of the reward into the
leaf node. Over the entire time sequence [T ], the rewards are
inserted sequentially. Each internal node x in Treek stores the
sum of all the leaf nodes in the tree rooted at x. First notice
that one can compute any vt using at most log(T ) nodes of
Treek. Second, notice that for any two neighboring datasets D
and D′ different in leaf node fi and fi′ at most log(T ) nodes
in Treek gets modified. So, if we flatten the complete tree as
a vector then for any neighboring datasets D and D′ one can
easily show that ‖Tree(D)− Tree(D′)‖1 ≤ log(T ). We will
further bound the amount of the noise added to each tree in
section V when evaluating the performance of our algorithm.
LaP-DAP Description. When service vendor i receives
context xj(t) from service vendor j, service vendor i first
determines the subspace C to which this context belongs and
the level l of it. Then we want to make sure whether each video
k ∈Mi has been selected for enough times for accurate esti-
mation (line4-6). If each video has been explored sufficiently,
Algorithm 2 LaP-DAP for other service vendors’ users
1: Input: k ∈ Mi; m, p, A, T , ǫ, G3(t).
2: Initialize P t = {X}, l = 0, M iC (0) = 0, ∀k ∈ Mi,
r¯ik,C(0) = 0, N
i
k,C(0) = 0, F
i
k,xi(t)
(0) = 0
3: Create empty binary tree Treek with T -leaves, ∀k ∈ Mi.
4: for t = 1, ..., T , xj(t) ∈ C do
5: if ∃k ∈Mi, such that N ik,C < G3(t) then
6: Select k and insert observed f ik,C(t).
7: else
8: Select k∗ = argmax
k∈Mi
rik,C (t) and observe f ik∗,xj(t)(t).
9: Insert F ik∗,xj(t)(t) = f
i
k∗,xj(t)
(t) + Lap(∆f
ε
) to Treek∗
10: end if
11: Update M iC (t), r¯ik,C(t), N ik,C(t).
12: if M tC ≥ Ampl then
13: Partition C.
14: end if
15: end for
we select the video k∗ with highest accuracy and observed the
reward f i
k∗,xi(t)
(t). Because after the training process, service
vendor j can gain access to this observed reward of service
vendor i and make evaluation based on it. To preserve the
privacy of service vendor i regarding this information, we add
Laplace noise with deviation λ = K log(T )/ε to f ik∗,xi(t)(t)(line 7-9). Finally we update some counters and judge whether
to partition the C as described in Phase 3 (line 11-14).
??????? ???????
?? ?? ??
??????? ???????
???? ???
??????? ????????
Fig. 4: An illustration of tree-based aggregation. Tree(D) and
Tree(D′) are two databases that differ in one component.
B. Algorithm Analysis
The properties of the proposed algorithm are analyzed in
this subsection. For simplicity of presentation, we replace
service vendors with learners. We prove that the regret is
sublinear converged over the time, and our P-DAP guarantees
differential privacy.
1) Regret Bound: For each subspace C, let uk,C =
supx∈Cuk,x and uk,C = infx∈Cuk,x. Let x∗ be the context at
the center of the hypercube C. We define the optimal arm for
subspce C as k∗ = argmax
k∈Ki
uk,x∗ . Then the suboptimal arms
for learner i in subspace C can be written as follows:
Ss,l,B =
{
k : uk∗,C − u¯k,C > Bm
−αl} , (7)
where B is a constant and α > 0. We will bound B to get
optimal solution. The regret in (2) can be written as the sum
of three components:
R (T ) ≤ Ro (T ) +Rs (T ) +Rn (T ) , (8)
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where Ro (T ) is the regret due to selecting suboptimal arms
from Mi by time T , Rs (T ) is the regret due to selecting
suboptimal arms from M−i and Rn (T ) is the regret of near
optimal selections by time T . Next, we bound each of these
terms separately.
Theorem 2. For every level-l context subspace C, with
control function G1 (t) = m2αlln(T ), the expected regret due
to choosing suboptimal arm k ∈ Mi, will be bounded as
follows:
E
[
Regok,C (T )
]
≤ m2αlln (T ) +
π2
3
+
2Lm−αl
ε
[ln (K) + ln (T )] . (9)
Proof: The regret of E[Regok,C (T )] is due to: 1) inherent
gap of bandit algorithm between the optimal selections and the
suboptimal selections; 2) the gap between approximately op-
timal reward applying exponential mechanism and suboptimal
selections (line 11-14 in Algorithm 1):
E
[
Regok,C (T )
]
≤ E
∑T
t=1
(
uk∗,x(t) − uεεu(x(t)),x(t)
)
≤ E
∑T
t=1
(
uk∗,x(t) − uk,x(t)
)
+ E
∑T
t=1
(
uk,x(t) − uεεu(x(t)),x(t)
)
= E
[
Reg1k,C (T )
]
+ E
[
Reg2k,C (T )
]
. (10)
Next, we will bound the two part of the E[Regok,C (T )]
separately:
Lemma 1. The inherent regret gap of bandit algorithm
between optimal arms and suboptimal arms E[Reg1k,c (T )] is
bounded as follows:
E
[
Reg1k,C (T )
]
≤ m2αlln (T ) +
π2
3
. (11)
Proof: We denote Fk(T ) the number of times that sub-
optimal arm k is selected by time T . For x ∈ C, let ∆uk,C =
uk∗,C − uk,C be the gap of reward between suboptimal arm
k and optimal arm k∗ in subspace C. As initially defined, the
regret of choosing suboptimal arm k is the expected number of
times when k is selected times the gap of mean rewards. That
is E[Reg1k,C (T )] =
∑T
t=1 Fk(T ) ·∆uk,C ≤
∑T
t=1 Fk(T )
for ∆uk,C ≤ 1. Inequality (11) results from the fact that
Fk(T ) will not be larger than m2αlln (T ) with the high
probability. Now we discuss the result in inequality (11) under
two circumstance.
Case1. Fk(T ) ≤ m2αlln(T ). Under this circumstance, (11)
holds correctly. Now we focus on case2.
Case2. Fk(t1) = m2αlln(T ) when t1 < T . Then we have
Reg1k,C (T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
I (k is picked at time t)
≤ m2αlln (T ) +
∑T
t=m2αl I (k is picked at time t).
Next we will figure out the probability that k is selected
under Case2.
When t > m2αlln (T ), if k is selected, we have rk,C (t) ≥
rk∗,C (t), this inequality holds when at least one of the
following holds:
r¯k,C(t) ≥ uk,C +Ht, (12)
rk∗,C(t) ≤ uk∗,C −Ht, (13)
r¯k,C(t) ≥ r¯k∗,C(t), (14)
r¯k,C(t) < u¯k,C +Ht, r¯k∗,C(t)> uk∗,C −Ht.
Then the probability when suboptimal arm k is picked can
be written as follows:
P[k is picked ∩Case2.]
≤ P[r¯k,C(t) ≥ u¯k,C +Ht]
+ P[r¯k∗,C(t) ≤ uk∗,C −Ht]
+ P[r¯k,C(t) ≥ r¯k∗,C(t), r¯k∗,C(t) < u¯k,C +Ht,
r¯k∗,C(t) > uk∗,C −Ht].
We denote wik,C(t) the set of rewards of arm k in subspace
C. Let Oik,C(t) be the event that at most an samples in
wik,c(t) are collected from suboptimal process functions of
the k-th arm. Different from classical finite-time bandit theory,
these samples are not identically distributed. Enlightened by
[31], in order to facilitate our analysis of the regret, we also
generate two different artificial i.i.d. processes to bound the
probabilities related to r¯k,C(t), k ∈ Mi. The first one is the
best process in which rewards are generated according to a
bounded i.i.d. process with expected reward u¯k,C , the other
one is the worst process in which the rewards are generated
according to a bounded i.i.d. process with expected reward
uk,C . Let rbestk,C (z) denote the sample mean of the z samples
from the best process and rworstk,C (z) denote the sample mean of
the z samples from the worst process. Thus, combining (7), for
any suboptimal arm we have: P(r¯k,C(t) ≥ r¯k∗,C(t), r¯k,C(t) <
uk,C+Ht, r¯k∗,C(t) > uk∗,C(t)−Ht) ≤ P(r¯
best
k,C (|w
i
k,C(t)|) ≥
r¯worstk∗,C (|w
i
k,C(t)|)−
a
n
), r¯bestk,C (|w
i
k,C(t)|) < uk,C +L
(√
d
ml
)α
+
Ht+
a
n
, r¯worstk∗,C (|w
i
k∗ ,C(t)|) > uk∗,C −L(
√
d
ml
)α−Ht, case2)).
Since k is a suboptimal arm, we have uk∗,C − u¯k,C >
Bm−αl, and :
r¯
worst
k∗,C (|wik∗,C(t)|) > uk∗,C − L(
√
d
ml
)α −Ht,
r¯
best
k,C (|wik,C(t)|) < u¯k,C + L(
√
d
ml
)α +Ht +
a
n
.
Given the condition:
2L(
√
d
ml
)α + 2Ht + 2
a
n
−Bm−αl ≤ 0, (15)
we have :
rbestk,C (|w
i
k,C(t)|) < r
worst
k∗,C (|w
i
k,C(t)|) −
a
n
,
which implies that suboptimal arms will hardly be selected by
time:
P[rk,C(t) ≥ rk∗,C(t), rk,C(t) < µ¯k,C +Ht, rk∗,C(t) > uk∗,C −Ht]
= 0. (16)
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In Case2. we have n ≥ m2αlln(t). In order to make (15)
hold, we assign B ≥ 2L(
√
d
ml
)α + 4, a = mαlln(t), Ht =
a
n
.
Then, we have:
P[r¯k,C(t) ≥ µ¯k,C +Ht] ≤ e
−2(Ht)2mαlln(T ) =
1
t2
,
P[r¯k∗,C(t) ≤ uk∗,C −Ht] ≤ e
−2(Ht)2mαlln(T ) =
1
t2
.
Thus, we have:
P(k is picked ∩Case2.) ≤ P(r¯k,C(t) ≥ u¯k,C +Ht)
+P(r¯k∗,C(t) ≤ uk∗,C(t)−Ht)
≤ 2
t2
,
then,
E[Reg1k,c(T )] ≤ m
2αlln(T ) +
∑T
m2αlln(T )
2
t2
≤ m2αlln(T ) + π
2
3 .
Before we derive Lemma 3, we provide a bound on the
sensitivity of exponential mechanism.
Lemma 2. The sensitivity of exponential mechanism is
bounded is follows:
∆u ≤ Lm−αl. (17)
Proof: In our framework, x1 and x2 are two input
data (users’ context vectors), which differ on at most one
component. The unity function u(x, k) represents the recom-
mendation reward depending on input context x and output
video k. By Definition 3 and inequality (4), we have
∆u = max
k∈Mi
max
x1,x2:‖x1−x2‖1≤1
|q(x1, k)− q(x2, k)|
= max
k∈Mi
max
x1,x2:‖x1−x2‖1≤1
|uk,x1 − uk,x2 |
≤ max
k∈Mi
max
x1,x2:‖x1−x2‖1≤1
L‖x− x′‖α ≤ Lm−αl.
Combining Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, we can derive Lemma
3 as follows:
Lemma 3. The regret due to the near optimal reward when
applying exponential mechanism can be bounded as follows:
E
[
Reg2k,C (T )
]
≤
2Lm−αl
ε
[ln (K) + ln (T )] . (18)
Proof: At each time slot, we do not choose the arm with
highest reward. Instead, we assign each arm a probability to be
chosen. Thus, at each time slot, there exists the gap of reward
when applying the randomly selection. By using Theorem 1,
in inequality (6), we have |R|= K, |ROPT | = 1 (we only have
one optimal arm). Then, we set t = ln(T ). Thus, at each time
slot, we have the regret by randomly selection as follows:
u(x, k)− u(x, εεu(x)) <
2∆u
ε
(ln(K) + ln(T )),
which holds with a probability less than 1
T
. Then, we have:
E
[
Reg2k,C(T )
]
=E
∑T
t=1
(
uk,x(t) − uεεu(x(t)),x(t)
)
≤
T∑
1
[∆q] • P[∆q < 2∆u
ε
(ln(K) + ln(T ))]
≤
T∑
1
2∆u
ε
(ln(K) + ln(T )) • 1
T
≤ 2Lm
−αl
ε
(ln(K) + ln(T )) ,
where ∆q = u(x, k)−u(x, εεu(x)) = uk,x(t)−uεεu(x(t)),x(t) ≤
2∆u
ε
(ln(K)+ ln(T )) denotes the regret bound of exponential
mechanism selection at each time slot.
Combining Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and inequality (10), our
Theorem 2 holds.
The above Theorem 2 implies that for k ∈ Mi, the proposed
algorithm make sure the suboptimal arms will be selected more
than m2αl ln(T ) with very small probability.
Lemma 4. For k ∈ M−i, with control function G2(t) =
m2αl ln(t) + Γ4m
αl and G1 (t) = m2αlln(T ), we have the
regret of choosing suboptimal k in subspace C by time T as
follows:
E[Regsk,C(T )] ≤ 2m2αlln(T ) + Γ
4
m
αl +
pi2
3
(1+
K
a
)ln(T ), (19)
where Γ is the near maximum value of the amount of total
noise added by time T . We will bound Γ in Lemma 5.
Proof: When we add Laplace noise to each time reward,
our estimate of the actual reward will be disturbed and our
number of times that need to be played until finding the
optimal arm will be increased. But we demonstrate that, after
each arm being trained G1(t) times, there will be no more
than m2αlln(T ) + Γ4m
αl times to be tried before finding the
optimal arm with a high probability.
For k ∈M−i, we define k is the supoptimal arm, and k∗ is
the optimal arm for subspace C. At t-th time slot, suboptimal
arm k is selected over k∗ if rk,C(t) ≥ rk∗,C(t) is true. Here,
the reward rk,C(t) ≥ rk∗,C(t) is the virtual reward that include
with noise for subspace C of arm k. Thus, we denote Rk,C(t)
the true reward of arm k for subspace C. Then suboptimal
arm k is selected, only if the following holds:
Rk,C(t) +
Γ
N ik,C(t)
≥ Rk∗,C(t) +
Γ
N ik∗,C(t)
. (20)
It can be easily shown that (17) is true, only if one of the
following equations holds:
Rk,C(t) ≥ uk,C +Ht, (21)
R¯k∗,C(t) ≤ uk∗,C −Ht, (22)
Rk,C(t) < uk,C +Ht, Rk∗,C(t) > uk∗,C −Ht,
Rk,C(t) +
Γ
N ik,C(t)
≥ Rk∗,C(t) +
Γ
N ik∗,C(t)
. (23)
As we have discussed above for k ∈ Mi, we also denote
best process and worst process to bound the probabilities.
Then, we have
R
best
k,C (|wik,C(t)|) < uk,C + L(
√
d
ml
)α +Ht +
a
n
,
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MULTIMEDIA, VOL. X, NO. X, SEPTEMBER 20XX 10
R
worst
k,C (|wik∗,C(t)|) > uk∗,C − L(
√
d
ml
)α −Ht),
R
best
k,C (|wik,C(t)|)+ Γ
N ik,C(t)
≥ Rworstk∗,C (|wik∗,C(t)|)+ Γ
N ik∗,C(t)
− a
n
.
When k is a suboptimal arm, we have uk∗,C−u¯k,C > Bm−αl.
Together imply that:
2L(
√
d
ml
)α + 2Ht +
Γ
N ik,C(t)
− Γ
N ik∗,C(t)
+ 2
a
n
−Bm−αl ≤ 0.
For n > N ik,C(t), Ht =
a
n
and B ≥ 2L(
√
d
ml
)α + 4, then,
we draw the conclusion that (20) holds when the following
holds:
2L(
√
d
ml
)α +
Γ
N ik,C(t)
+ 4
a
N ik,C(t)
−Bm−αl ≤ 0.
Then we come to a conclusion that when N ik,C(t) ≥
m2αlln(T ) + Γ4m
αl
, the inequality (20) can not hold. (we
use SiC(t) denote this case), directly by the use of Chernoff
bound, we can show that :
P(Rk,C(t) ≥ µk,C +Ht) ≤
1
t2
, (24)
P(Rk∗,C(t) ≤ uk∗,C −Ht) ≤
1
t2
. (25)
Let Oik,C(t) be the event that at most an samples in w
i
k,C(t)
are collected from suboptimal process functions of the k-th
arm. Obviously for any k ∈ Mi, Oik,C(t) = Ω, while this is
not always true for k ∈ M−i. Combining (17) and (18), for
k ∈M−i, we have:
P(Oik.C(t), S
i
C(t)) ≤
2
t2
.
For k ∈ Mi obviously we have P(Oik,C(t)C = 0) .
For k ∈ M−i, let Y ik,C(t) denote the random variable, the
number of times suboptimal function m of for arm k is chosen
when event SiC(t) holds. We have {Oik,C(t)C , SiC(t)} =
{Y ik,C(t) ≥ a}. Applying the Markov inequality, we have
P(Oik,C(t)
C , SiC(t)) ≤
E[Y ik,C(t)]
a
. Let Eik,C(t) be the event
that a suboptimal processing function m ∈ Mk is called by
learner k, when it is invoked by learner i for the t-th time, we
have
Y ik,C(t) =
∑wik,C(t)
t′=1
I(Eik,C(t
′)),
and
P
[
Eik,C (t)
]
≤
∑
m∈Mj
P (r¯m,C (t) ≥ r¯
∗m
C (t))
After each video m ∈ Mk has been fully explored by
G3 (t) = m
2αlln(t)/K times, as we have proofed in Lemma
1, we have
P(Eik,C(t)) ≤
∑
m∈Mk
2e−2(Ht)
2m2αlln(t) ≤
2K
t2
eK .
Together imply that
E[Y ik,C(t)] ≤
∞∑
t′=1
P(Eik,C(t
′)) ≤
∞∑
t=1
2K
t2
eK .
Therefore, from the Markov inequality we get
P(Oik,l(t)
C , SiC(t)) ≤
E[Y ik,C(t)]
a
≤
π2
3
· eK
K
a
ln(T ).
Then, for arm k ∈ M−i, we have
E[Regsk.C(T )] ≤
T∑
t=1
I(k is picked)
≤ 2m2αlln(T ) + Γ
4
m
αl
ln(Γ) +
T∑
t=1
P(SiC(t))
≤ 2m2αlln(T ) + Γ
4
m
αl
ln(Γ)
+
T∑
t=1
[
P(Ok.C(t), S
i
C(t)) + P(O
i
k,C(t)
c
, S
i
C(t))
]
≤ 2m2αlln(T ) + Γ
4
m
αl
ln(Γ) +
pi2
3
e
K(1 +
K
a
)ln(T ).
Lemma 5. For all arms k ∈M−i and all time step t ∈ [T ],
w.p. ≥ 1 − σ (over the randomness), the amount of noise Γ
added in the total reward for k till time t is at most |Nk(t)| ≤
θlog2(T )log(θT log(T )/σ)
ε
, where θ is the number of arms belong
to M−i.
Proof: For the ease of notation, let Rk(t) be the true
total reward for arm k until time t. As discussed above,
Nk(t) = rk(t) − Rk(t) is a sum of at most log(T ) Laplace
distributed random variables Lap( θ log(T )
ε
). By the tail prop-
erty of Laplace distribution, we know that for a given random
variable x ∼ Lap(λ), with probability 1−ϕ, |x| ≤ λ log(1/ϕ).
So, with probability at least (1− ϕ/log(T ))log(T ) ≤ 1 − ϕ,
|Nk(t)| ≤
θlog2(T )log(log(T )/ϕ)
ε
. Taking the union bound over
all k-arms and all time step T and setting ϕ = σ/(θT ), we
have w.p. ≥ 1 − σ, for all k ∈ M−i and for all t ∈ [T ],
|Nk(t)| ≤
θlog2(T )log(θT log(T )/σ)
ε
.
Lemma 6. The regret due to choose near-optimal arms
RegnC(T ) in each level-l subspace is bounded as follows:
RegnC(T ) ≤ ABm
l(p−a). (26)
Proof: Due to the definition of near-optimal arms, regret
due to selecting a near-optimal arm is at most Bm−αl. Because
there could be at most Ampl slots for a level-l subspace
according to the partitioning rule, the regret of this part is
at most ABml(p−a).
Now, we combine the results in Lemma 4, Lemma 6 and
Theorem 2 to obtain the complete regret bound. The regret
depends on the context arrival process and hence, we let
Hil (T ) denote the number of level-l subspaces that have been
activated by time T of learner i. Before we derive Theorem
6, we provide a bound on the highest level of active subspace
by time .
Theorem 3. The complete regret of our private distributed
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learning algorithm is bounded by
R(T ) ≤∑k∈Mi∑lHil (T ) ·
[
m2αlln(T ) + π
2
3
+ 2Lm
−αl
ε
(ln(K) + ln(T ))
]
+
∑
k∈M−i
∑
lH
i
l (T ) ·
[
2m2αlln(T ) + Γ
4
mαl
+π
2
3
eK
(
1 + K
a
ln(T )
)]
+
∑
lH
i
l (T ) · ABml(p−a).
(27)
Proof: Combining the result of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3
it is easy to see that Ro(T ) is bounded as follows:
Ro(T ) ≤
∑
l
Hil (T )
∑
k∈Mi
·E[Regok.C(T )]
≤∑
l
Hil (T ) · (M − 1)
[
m2αlln(T ) + π
2
3
+ 2Lm
−αl
ε
(ln(K) + ln(T ))
]
.
By applying Lemma 4, the Rs(T ) is bounded by
Rs(T ) ≤
∑
k∈M−i
∑
l
Hil (T ) ·E[Regsk·C(T )]
≤ ∑
k∈M−i
∑
l
Hil (T ) ·
[
2m2αlln(T ) + Γ
4
mαl
+π
2
3
eK
(
1+K
a
ln(T )
)]
.
Finally, Rn(T ) is bounded by
Rn(T ) ≤
∑
l
H
i
l (T ) · E[RegnC(T )] ≤
∑
l
H
i
l (T ) ·ABml(p−a)
Theorem is resulted of the summing of above three equation.
The following corollary establishes the regret bound when
the context arrivals are uniformly distributed over the entire
context space. This is the worst-case scenario because the
algorithm has to learn over the entire context space. Before
we derive Corollary 2, we provide a bound on the highest
level of active subspace by time.
Lemma 7. Given a time T , the highest level of active
subspace is at most
⌈
logm(
T
A
)/P
⌉
+ 1.
Proof: It is easy to see that the highest possible level of
active subspace is achieved when all requests by time have the
same context. This requires Amlmax ≤ T . Therefore, lmax =⌈
logm(
T
A
)/P
⌉
+ 1.
Corollary 2. If the context arrival by time T is uniformly
distributed over the context space, and we set the partition
parameter p much larger than similarity parameter α we
have:
R (T ) ≤ Ro (T ) +Rs (T ) +Rn (T )
≤ ( T
A
)
d+2α
d+p ·md+2αln(T ) (K +M − 1)
+( T
A
)
d+α
d+p ·md+αAB
+( T
A
)
d+p−α
d+p ·md+p−α Γ
4
+( T
A
)
d
d+p ·md · π2
3
(K + (M − 1)eK)
+(T
4
)
d−α
d+pmd−α[ 2KL
ε
(ln(K) + ln(T )) + π
2
3
(M − 1)eK ln(T )].
(28)
Proof: First we calculate the highest level of subspace
when context arrivals are uniform. In the worst case, all level
l subspaces will stay active, and then they are deactivated until
all level-(l+ 1) subspaces become active and so on. Let lmax
be the maximum level subspace under this scenario. Because
there must be some time T ′ < T when all subspaces are level
subspaces, we have
mdlAmpl < T,
where mdl is the maximum number of level l subspaces and
Ampl is the maximum number of time slots that belong to
a level l subspace. Thus, we have lmax < logm(
T
A
)
d+p + 1 .
Combining this conclusion with the regret bound in Theorem
3, we get Corollary 2.
We have shown that the regret upper bound of our private
distributed learning model is sublinear in time, implying our
computing service vendors can select optimal videos by time.
Also, fast convergence to optimal is favorable to dynamically
changing big data environments.
2) Differential Privacy: We finally prove that our algorithm
can preserve privacy of user’s contextual information and the
that of each service vendor’s videos.
Theorem 4. The Algorithm 1 can preserves (ε, 0)-
differential privacy for user’s contextual information.
Proof: Let x1 and x2 be two input context vectors
that differ in one single attribute, µ denote the reward of
exponential mechanism, R denotes the output (sequence of
selected videos) space of exponential mechanism. Then R =
{k1,k2, ..., kM+K−1}. We suppose that the same user’s data
stream has come for N times over time arbitrary sequence
{t1,t2,...,tN}, as a result, our algorithm selected an arbitrary
sequence of arms such that ME(x1, µ, R) = {k1, k2, ..., kN}
at the time sequence. We denote µ(x1, ki) the mean reward
of arm ki for context x1 at time ti. In our algorithm µ(x1, ki)
equals rki,C(ti). C is the active subspace to which the context
x1 belongs at time. If x1 and x2 belong to the same subspace
C at time ti, then µ(x1, ki) = µ(x2, ki). We construct a
function I(t1, x1, x2). When x1, x2 belong to the same active
subspace, the value of the function equals one, otherwise zero.
We consider the relative probability of our algorithm for given
context x1 and x2:
P[ME(x1,µ,R)={k1,k2,...,kN}]
P[ME(x2,µ,R)={k1,k2,...,kN}]
=
N∏
i=1
(
exp(
ε′µ(x1,ki)
2∆µ
)
∑
k′∈R
exp(
ε′µ(x1,k
′)
2∆µ
)
)
/
(
exp(
ε′µ(x2,ki)
2∆µ
)
∑
k′∈R
exp(
ε′µ(x2,k
′)
2∆µ
)
)
=
N∏
i=1
exp( ε
′(µ(x1,ki)−µ(x2,ki))
2∆µ
) · (
∑
k′∈R
exp(
ε′µ(x2,k
′)
2∆µ
)
∑
k′∈R
exp(
ε′µ(x1,k
′)
2∆µ
)
)
=
N∏
i=1
exp( ε
′(µ(x1,ki)−µ(x2,ki))
2∆µ
) · (
∑
k′∈R
exp(
ε′µ(x2,k
′)
2∆µ
)
∑
k′∈R
exp(
ε′µ(x1,k
′)
2∆µ
)
)
≤
N∏
i=1
exp
(
ε′
2
· I(ti, x1, x2)
)
· exp
(
ε′
2
· I(ti, x1, x2)
)
×(
∑
k′∈R
exp(
εµ(x1,k
′)
2∆µ
)
∑
k′∈R
exp(
εµ(x1,k
′)
2∆µ
)
)
=
N∏
i=1
exp(ε′ · I(ti, x1, x2))
≤ exp(Nε′)
= exp(ε).
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Thus, the theorem follows.
Theorem 5. The Algorithm 2 can preserve (ε, 0)-
differential privacy for service vendors’ videos.
Proof: For k ∈ M−i and subspace C, let [T ′] =
{1, ..., T ′} denotes the sequence of time slots that videos is
selected for simplicity, where T ′ < T . let D = 〈f1, ..., fT 〉 be
a data set of true rewards. We call a data set D′ neighbor of
D if it differs from D in exactly one reward. We define Ft(C)
the virtual outcome (reward with noise added), then we have,
at each round, the probability of same outcome for different
arm k1 and k2:
P[ML(k1,t)=Ft(C)]
P[ML(k2,t)=Ft(C)]
=
exp(− ε′|ft(k1)−Ft(C)|∆f )
exp(− ε′|ft(k2)−Ft(C)|∆f )
= exp
(
ε′
∆f (|ft(k2)− Ft(C)| − |ft(k1)− Ft(C)|)
)
≤ exp( ε
′
∆f |ft(k1)− ft(k2)|)
= exp( ε
′
∆f ‖ft(k1)− ft(k2)‖1)
≤ exp(ε′).
In our problem model, the proposed algorithm only accesses
the reward for its computation via the tree based aggregation
scenario. Learner i maintains M − 1 trees for other learner’s
reward sets respectively. Each tree guarantee ε′ = ε/(M − 1)
differential privacy. With the composition property stated in
Corollary 1, we can draw the conclusion that our algorithm 2
is ε-differential private.
Theorem 4 shows that the attributes (e.g., social status,
hobby and age) in users’ sensitive context vectors cannot be
inferred from the recommended results. The proof of Theorem
5 supports that the service vendors fail to extract information
about videos in neighbor service vendors’ repositories by the
rewards. In summary, our Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 prove that
the proposed algorithm P-DAP can preserve the both privacy
of users and service vendors synchronously.
VI. GEOMETRIC DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In the previous section, we preserve privacy to the same
extend for all subspaces. That is to say, we set the same
value of ε for the whole context space. This section presents
our refined geometric differentially private model. Considering
the sparsity and heterogeneity of big data, some context
subspaces are scattered with countless data points, however,
other subspaces are nearly blank. A large and increasing
number of statistical analyses can be done in a differential
private manner while adding little noise. As also declared
in [4], “the larger the dataset, the less a given amount of
blurring will affect utility”. Thus, our geometric differential
private algorithm varies the amount of noised add to subspaces
according to the size of each subspace. To be specific, we
decrease the privacy level (larger value of ε) when the density
of datasets increased (l denotes the density of subspaces). In
this way, the performance loss due to the randomness brought
by differential privacy can be reduced extensively. For current
active subspaces, we set different value of ε related to the
density l of them. Specifically, we increase the value of ε
when l increases. Fig. 5 gives an illustration of this method.
For simplicity, we take the one-dimensional context space for
instance. Leaf nodes presented in Fig. 5 are current active
subspaces, we set different value of ε related to the density l
of each subspaces.
????????????????????? ???
?? ???
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Fig. 5: An illustrative example of geometric private model:
For simplicity, we assume dimension of context space d = 1.
The left segment shows the partition pattern. The right tree
structure shows the partition process, where blue leaf nodes
denote the active subspaces. Subspaces with different level-l
get different value of ε.
The modified method works as follows. After we get enough
context samples, we already have accurate estimations for
rewards. From now on, for each context arrival, we first figure
out to which subspace it belongs. Then we judge the level l of
the subspace and set ε = ε0mαl for level-l subspaces, where
m and α are constants as we have defined previously.
Theorem 6. Geometric differential privacy has a lower
regret bound than uniform differential privacy as follows:
RG(T ) ≤ R(T )−
(
(T
A
)
α
mα − 1
)(
A1(
T
A
)
d−2α
d+p md−2α
+A2(
T
A
)
d−α
d+pmd−α
)
,
(29)
where A1 and A2 are two constants. When time T goes into
infinity, the value of the second term on the right side of
the inequality will increase exponentially. Thus, the result of
Theorem 6 proves that our geometric differential privacy has
greatly reduced the regret bound.
Proof: We set ε = ε0mαl and the amount of noise Γ =
Γ0
ε0mαl
in the geometric differential privacy method. Thus, we
have:
RG(T ) ≤ R(T )−
∑lmax
l=1 (M − 1)m
αl(Γ0
ε0
− Γ0
ε0mαl
)
−
∑lmax
l=1 K (ln(T ) + ln(T )) ·
(
2Lm−αl
ε0
− 2Lm
−αl
ε0mαl
)
≤
(
(T
A
)
α
mα − 1
)(
K(ln(T )+ln(T ))
ε0
(T
A
)
d−2α
d+p md−2α
+Γ0
ε0
(T
A
)
d−α
d+pmd−α
)
.
For simplicity, we use A1 and A2 denote K(ln(T )+ln(T ))ε0
and Γ0
ε0
respectively. Here the Theorem 6 holds.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we demonstrate the theoretical regret bounds
for our algorithms with empirical results based on very large
real-world datasets, which includes massive multimedia data
and social media users-generated big data. We show that:
1) regret bounds are sublinear converged over time; 2) Our
differentially private methods work well and do not come
at the expense of recommendation accuracy; 3) Geometric
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differentially private method has a lower regret bound and
higher accuracy. Finally, we use users’ context vectors refined
from real datasets to test the recommendation accuracy of our
algorithms.
A. Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance of our recommendation system,
training data and test data about users and videos should be
gathered. We collect numerous user context vectors extracted
from large real datasets in Sina Microblog, a popular online
social networking site in China. This datasets contain users’
social profiles and multimedia content they shared. We also ex-
tract public information from Youku, a prevalent video sharing
site (VSS) in China, such as video attributes, popular videos.
After preprocessing, around 74000 video items, 578000 user
context vectors with 13900-dimension are stored.
For simplicity, we deploy the recommendation system on
a small-sized framework with four distributed video service
vendors. Using collected video data, we constructed a set of
1000 videos for each service vendor respectively, Following
the real situation, we arrange different video items for different
service vendors. We randomly sample 200000 users ( context
vectors) from our stored datasets, and input these vectors
to our simulative recommendation system sequentially. When
receiving user arrival, service vendor selects a particular video
to recommend. At the end of this time slot, the reward of this
selection, a binary random number (equal 0 or 1), is produce,
to imitate the result of user’s click action. Since our scheme
appertains to the class of online distributed learning tech-
niques, we will compare our scheme against several previous
approaches:
• Centralized learning with adaptive partition (CAP) [33]:
There is only one learner in this centralized framework
who partitions the context space dynamically over time
according to the number of user arrivals.
• Distributed learning with uniform partition (DUP) [31]:
This distributed framework contains multiple cooperative
learners. But all of them uniformly partition context space
initially. No partition process is involved over time.
• Distributed learning with adaptive partition (DAP): This
is the primal model of the proposed P-DAP. Multiple
learners in this distributed framework adaptively partition
the context space over time (No privacy preservation in
this model).
Finally, to thoroughly analyze the performance of our pro-
posed algorithms, we logically deploy our experiment by the
following 4 steps:
Step 1. We first compare our primal model DAP with
previous work, i.e., CAP [33] and DUP [31]. We input sampled
200000 users’ context vectors sequentially into these three
models respectively. That is to say, each model will receive
same input datasets with 200000 elements. We plot the regrets
and the average regrets (to evaluate the convergence rate)
of each model. Afterwards, we extracted four groups (with
different size) of user context vectors from collected real
datasets. Then, we input these four groups context vectors into
CAP, DUP and DAP to test the performance of each model.
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Fig. 6: Regrets in CAP, DUP and DAP
N CAP DUP DAP
5000 70.32% 73.32% 87.34%
10000 75.36% 74.52% 90.21%
20000 76.88% 74.78% 91.02%
50000 77.34% 75.08% 92.17%
TABLE II: Average accuracies of DAP, CAP and DUP
Step 2. We construct our differentially private model (P-
DAP) based on step 1. As for each vendors’ own user, arms
(videos and other service vendors) are randomly selected
according to computed probabilities. Simultaneously, Laplace
noise is added when recommending videos to other service
vendors’ users. To prove the smooth trade-off between privacy
and accuracy in our P-DAP, we vary the privacy constant ε
from 0.01 to 1 and compare them with non-private model
(DAP). Finally, we use our extracted four groups of context
vectors to test the accuracy of these models.
Step 3. To prove the lower regret of geometric differential
private method (GP-DAP), we set different value of ε for
different context subspaces. To be specific, the value of ε
wax with the decrease of the density of data points in each
subspace. Then, we compare the regrets of GP-DAP and P-
DAP (ε=0.01) over time.
B. Results and Analysis
We first evaluate DAP’s performances in terms of regret
loss and average regret loss in Step 1. In the meanwhile, we
compare DAP, CAP and UAP and plot the regret lines in Fig.
6.
Fig. 6 (a) shows the comparison with DAP, CAP and DUP
in terms of regrets, where the horizontal axis is the number of
user arrivals. From the tendency of “Regret” lines, we can draw
the conclusion that the regret of DAP is sublinear converged
over time. And obviously, DAP has lower regret loss than DUP
and CAP all the time. Fig. 6 (b) records the average regrets
(normalized by number of arrivals) of DAP, CAP and DUP,
where the horizontal axis is the number of user arrivals. As we
can see, our primal model DAP converges fast and has lower
average accuracy then CAP and DUP. Also, results show the
average regret of DAP in the tail of lines is extremely small
(smaller than 0.02 per user).
Table II records the average accuracies (total reward divided
by number of arrivals) in our tested process, where N repre-
sents the number of context vectors used by test. We find that
as the number of arrivals increased, the average accuracies
of each model get promoted as well. This could be resulted
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Fig. 7: Regrets in P-DAP and DAP
P-DAP DAPN ǫ=0.01 ǫ=0.1 ǫ=1
5000 77.54% 77.78% 78.96% 86.84%
10000 78.75% 79.35% 79.24% 89.28%
20000 79.92% 80.34% 81.06% 90.23%
50000 80.12% 81.16% 82.12% 91.56%
TABLE III: Average accuracies of DAP and P-DAP
from the fact that systems trained better as number of samples
increased. Also, we can read from the table that the average
accuracy of our DAP can reach up to 92%, but neither those
of CAP nor DUP can exceed 80 %. Finally, We can draw the
conclusion that DAP outperforms CAP and DUP.
Fig.7 gives the simulation experiment results of P-DAP.
Fig.7 (a) shows both the regrets of P-DAP and DAP are
sublinear over time. To be specific, we can see from the
tendency of regret lines that as privacy preservation level get
increased (smaller ε), regrets converged more slowly. Fig.7
(b) shows our differentially private P-DAP has low-regret (no
more than 0.03 per time slot) even for a high level of privacy
preservation (e.g., ε = 0.01). The regret obtained by the non-
private algorithm has the lowest regret as expected. More
significantly, the regret gets closer to the non-private regret
as its privacy preservation is weaker.
Table III records our tested average accuracies for DAP and
P-DAP with different privacy preservation level. As we can
read from the table, average accuracy of DAP can reach to
91.56% and those of our P-DAP with different values of ε is
greater than 80% by time.
Fig. 8 shows our simulation results of GP-DAP and P-
DAP, where we set ε=0.01. From Fig. 8 (a) tells us the
regret of GP-DAP is less than that of P-DAP by 32%. We
can immediately draw the conclusion that GP-DAP cut the
regret loss extensively. We also use different set of data with
different volume to test the accuracies of P-DAP and GP-DAP.
Fig. 8 (b) shows the comparison of these average accuracies.
Both GP-DAP and P-DAP have high accuracy for each group,
and the accuracies become slightly higher when increasing
the sizes of groups. Obviously, GP-DAP always has higher
accuracy than P-DAP.
Table IV records the test result of GP-DAP and P-DAP
(ε=0.01) of different user groups. At first glance, the accura-
cies increased slightly as we add more context samples into
test group. This is due to the fact that, more samples can help
systems get better estimation of each processing functions.
Also, we can see that, the average accuracy of the GP-DAP
No. of arrivals ×106
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
R
eg
re
t
×104
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
P-DAP(ǫ=0.01)
GP-DAP
(a) Regret
No. of arrivals ×104
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
A
ve
ra
ge
 A
cc
ur
ac
y
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P-DAP(ǫ=0.01)
GP-DAP
(b) Average Accuracy
Fig. 8: Regrets and Accuracies in P-DAP and GP-DAP
N 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
GP-DAP 82.44% 84.36% 85.23% 86.74% 87.33% 88.17%
P-DAP
(ǫ=0.01) 77.31% 77.87% 78.42% 79.14% 80.06% 81.64%
TABLE IV: Tested average accuracies of GP-DAP and DAP
will be greater than 88% as number of user arrivals exceed
30000.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a differential private
distributed learning framework for video recommendation for
online social networks. To tackle with the large value and
heterogeneity of big data, we adopt dynamic space partition
to distributed contextual bandit. Concerned with the privacy
of social network users and that of video service vendors, we
use exponential mechanism and Laplace mechanism simulta-
neously. Furthermore, to alleviate the performance loss due
to introducing differential privacy, we refine our framework
to novel geometric differentially private model. We have
theoretically analyzed our algorithms in terms of performance
loss (regret) and privacy preserving. We have also evaluated
our algorithms, demonstrating their sublinear converged re-
grets, delicate trade-off between performance loss and privacy
preserving level and extensively reduction.
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